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Comrade Ammara

11. Financialisation, real estate, and fictitious capital

Financialisation cannot be explained by a single cause. Pressure on profitability in productive sectors can encourage capital to seek returns through finance, real estate, and speculative assets. But the scale and form of this movement are also shaped by credit expansion, deregulation, institutional change, and state policy.

11.1 Fictitious capital

Fictitious capital refers to tradable claims on future monetary income: shares, bonds, loans, mortgage-backed securities, and many derivatives. The term distinguishes the market value of these claims from capital actually advanced and functioning in production. Their prices are formed by capitalising expected future payments, so they can rise or fall without a corresponding change in current productive capacity. Across the capitalist economy as a whole, however, these claims can be sustained only through future income generated and redistributed through production, profits, wages, rents, interest, and taxation.[37]

A share can be understood as a claim on a stream of expected future profits (or dividends); a bond as a claim on a stream of interest payments; and many structured assets as claims on bundled or re-sliced cash flows. A basic way to see this is capitalisation. If an asset is expected to yield net receipts \(R_t\) (dividends, interest, rents, or other contractual payoffs) over time, and those receipts are discounted at rate \(d\) (which may incorporate risk and liquidity), then its market valuation can be written schematically as

\[ K_f = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{R_t}{(1+d)^t}. \tag{11.1} \]

We use \(d\) (not \(i\)) for the discount rate to avoid confusing it with the commodity index \(i\) used elsewhere. This is a stylised expression (it assumes a stable discounting convention and a reasonably well-defined expected flow), but it shows how the market value of a claim can move sharply even when the underlying production of value changes little.

Here \(K_f\) is not capital in the sense of means of production and labour-power set in motion. It is the market price of a claim on expected future payments, formed through capitalisation and discounting. Such claims can rise in value without any corresponding increase in current productive capacity, but their expansion is ultimately limited by the monetary incomes from which dividends, interest, rents, and other payments must be made.

Fictitious capital can expand far beyond the growth of surplus value actually produced and realised, but the monetary claims it represents remain constrained by the incomes available to sustain them. Crises erupt when the expectations embedded in \(K_f\) become incompatible with the underlying capacity of production and realisation to sustain those cash flows. Asset prices then fall sharply, destroying or revaluing paper wealth, while leaving behind debts, unemployment, and social damage.

11.2 Tech hype as a vehicle for speculative valuation

Techno-utopian narratives can serve as vehicles for speculative valuation, helping capitalise expectations of future profits, monopoly positions, and revenue streams into present asset prices: venture-funded firms and their investors often sell not present profitability but stories about future monopoly positions and future command over revenue streams. Under conditions of weak productive profitability, capital hunts for assets whose valuation can be pushed upward faster than any measured improvement in everyday life. Often the immediate aim is to capitalise an expectation of future revenue, lock in market power, and attract early entrants to a rising claim.

High-profile frauds are only the most visible edge of this logic. More commonly, we see cycles where technologies are marketed as world-changing mainly because that narrative can justify venture capital, inflate stock prices, or produce monopoly rents through patents, platforms, and gatekept access. In this sense, techno-utopianism is not merely an idea; it is a financial mechanism that helps convert uncertain futures into tradable claims in the present.

Technological development remains decisive, but under capitalism the dominant selector is expected profitability and the possibility of securing controllable revenue streams, rather than social need. That is why comparatively “boring” public goods—mass transit, universal sanitation, public housing, open-access health systems, resilient grids—are chronically underbuilt, while speculative fantasies can attract extraordinary funding. The difference is not technical feasibility alone; it is the difference between what meets needs and what can be owned, priced, and capitalised.

11.3 Example: real estate and speculation in Pakistan

In many parts of the global South, including Pakistan, the combination of energy costs, infrastructural bottlenecks, political instability, and import dependence has made productive investment risky. At the same time, property speculation, urban land grabs, and financial arbitrage have offered relatively easier gains for those with capital.[73]1

Land prices and the capitalisation of rent.

From a Marxian standpoint, a plot of urban land is not “capital” in the same sense as a machine or a factory: it does not itself create new value. Yet it can command a price because it can command a stream of rent. In practice, land and housing prices are often formed as the capitalised value of expected future rents (actual or anticipated), discounted by an interest rate and adjusted for expectations of appreciation. In stripped-down form, if a site is expected to yield an annual rent \(R\) and the relevant discount rate is \(d\), then a regulating benchmark is

\[ P \approx \frac{R}{d}. \]

In that sense, much of what is bought and sold in speculative property markets is a tradable claim on future income streams—a form of fictitious-capital valuation anchored in rent expectations and credit conditions, not a direct measure of new value created in production.2

This pattern is inseparable from belated, uneven development and the structure of the state. Where local capital has historically remained narrow, import- and contract-dependent, and politically risk-averse, it has often failed to build an industrial base capable of absorbing labour at scale and raising productivity in a broad, socially transformative way. In that vacuum, the most coherent and force-concentrated institutions of the capitalist state can become not only coercive arbiters but also major economic organisers: they sit atop land allocations, procurement chains, regulatory power, and the “security” framing through which budgets and property regimes are protected.3 Such institutions are central forms of the capitalist state and, in crisis conditions, can expand their economic footprint as other fractions falter.4

In that context, liberal hopes that rotating civilian parties will steadily produce a secular-democratic modernisation run into a material barrier: the underlying property relations, the world-market constraint, and the coercive apparatus that defends both. Without confronting those relations—especially land, finance, strategic infrastructure, and the external discipline of debt and conditionality—electoral alternation tends to reshuffle administrators while leaving the core drivers of speculation, informalisation, and repression intact.[74, 40]5

This leads to:

  • a misallocation of resources towards luxury housing, gated communities, and malls while basic manufacturing and public services are starved of investment;

  • a reliance on imported goods and remittances, generating trade deficits and external debt; and

  • rising land prices that push workers and peasants to the margins, deepening class and gendered burdens of social reproduction.

A standard mainstream objection, and the Marxian reply.

A common mainstream framing is that property booms are simply the outcome of “supply and demand”: rapid urbanisation, regulatory bottlenecks, and insufficient housing supply, possibly amplified by monetary conditions. Marxian analysis does not deny these proximate factors; it asks why the adjustment takes the form it does under capitalism. Under private property in land, shortages are not resolved by democratic planning of social housing and infrastructure at scale; they are resolved through price, credit rationing, and the conversion of access into rent. The outcome is not merely “high prices” but a class project: the reproduction of wealth through asset appreciation and rent extraction, defended by state power.

From a Marxian perspective, this pattern follows from competition for returns. When rent-bearing and speculative claims offer higher expected returns than productive accumulation, capital can be redirected towards property, credit, monopoly rights, and other claims on future income. State policy, land allocation, financial regulation, and access to credit help determine where these opportunities arise and which capitals are able to capture them.6

Surplus value mediated by land, credit, and state enforcement.

A slightly more concrete way to state the mechanism is this: when accumulation in productive industry is constrained or politically risky, the attraction of property is that it can (i) preserve wealth through inflation and currency instability, (ii) generate rental income, and (iii) function as collateral for leverage, procurement, and credit. In that sense, real estate speculation is not an alternative to the extraction of surplus value; it is a route for claiming and securing it through land, balance sheets, and state enforcement.

Rent, collateral, and the credit channel.

Property booms are rarely “just” about housing demand. They are also about balance sheets. Land and built space can be pledged as collateral; collateral supports borrowing; borrowing supports new purchases; and rising valuations then validate the lending retroactively—until they do not. In that sense, real estate often operates as a hinge between fictitious capital (paper claims) and everyday reproduction (rent, eviction risk, household budgets).

How this reorganises everyday life.

The headline macro-effects listed above take specific spatial and social forms when land and housing are treated primarily as assets. These are not incidental side-effects; they are mechanisms through which a rentier bloc reproduces itself:

  • Rents and land prices rise faster than wages, tightening the reproduction constraint on workers and shifting more income toward rentier claims (including through informal rent, “key money”, and land-banking).

  • Peripheralisation accelerates: workers are pushed outward to cheaper land, increasing commute time and the unpaid labour of managing distance (often intensifying gendered burdens where care work is already unequal).

  • Informalisation of shelter expands where formal access is priced out, intensifying insecurity and exposure to climate hazards.

  • Urban public goods are reorganised around enclaves: infrastructure is built to raise asset values and secure access for high-income zones, rather than to universalise services.

Why this is not a “national culture” story.

These dynamics are not about some uniquely local preference for plots. They are about the interaction of: (i) uneven development and constrained productive accumulation, (ii) monetary instability and foreign-exchange constraint, (iii) the state’s role as enforcer of property and allocator of land/permissions, and (iv) the world market, in which dollars and external credit discipline domestic policy. In those conditions, land can appear as a more reliable store of value than productive investment—even though, for society as a whole, it can deepen stagnation by starving employment-generating sectors.

Crisis form: when the claim outruns the cash flow.

The contradiction returns when valuations and credit claims outrun the ability of households and firms to service rents, mortgages, and interest. Then “wealth” that looked solid is abruptly revalued: prices fall, projects stall, balance sheets break, and the state is pressured either to socialise losses (bank rescues, developer bailouts) or to impose the losses downward (foreclosures, evictions, austerity). This is a classic pattern of fictitious-capital crisis: paper claims are written down, but the social damage remains.

What the property boom does.

Real estate speculation is not an alternative to exploitation; it is a mode of organising and claiming the surplus produced elsewhere, and a way of disciplining labour through the cost of reproduction. It can sustain accumulation temporarily by absorbing surplus capital and credit, but it also tends to build a more fragile and rent-heavy economy whose “growth” depends on rising claims rather than rising social capacity.


  1. For an institutional anchor on weak and volatile productive investment (and the macro constraints that shape it), see the State Bank of Pakistan’s recent Annual Report discussion of growth composition, private fixed investment trends, and external-sector pressures.[67] The analytical claim here is not that “property is irrational” but that, under these conditions, the expected risk-adjusted returns on productive accumulation can be low relative to rentier and speculative strategies. ↩

  2. This is why property booms are often tightly connected to credit cycles and interest-rate regimes: if expected rents are held constant while the effective discount rate falls, the capitalised price rises mechanically. Conversely, tighter credit or rising interest rates can trigger sharp repricing. In Pakistan, these dynamics sit alongside dollar constraint and inflation expectations, which can further intensify the turn toward land as a “store of value” even when underlying productive accumulation is weak. ↩

  3. This is a structural point about how coercion, property, and accumulation are fused in the capitalist state, not a claim that any single institution “stands outside” the state. The category at issue is the state’s role as an organiser and guarantor of property relations under conditions of uneven development and crisis. ↩

  4. A useful way to frame the mechanism is: when industrial accumulation is constrained, access to land, licences, and state-backed contracts becomes a privileged route to secure and compound returns. This can consolidate a rentier bloc whose reproduction depends on controlling allocations and exemptions rather than raising productivity through large-scale productive investment. ↩

  5. Real housing shortages, infrastructure deficits, and migration pressures are routinely managed through price under capitalist property relations and converted into rent opportunities: scarcity and access become revenue streams. A “housing crisis” can therefore coexist with empty luxury units, gated enclaves, and land-banking, because profitability is organised around asset valuation and rent extraction rather than social need. ↩

  6. More precisely: the tendency is toward intensified competition for profit, which can push capitals into (i) rent-seeking and monopoly claims where available, (ii) credit-fuelled asset-price strategies, and (iii) state-backed appropriation of land and infrastructure rents. These are not separate from accumulation; they are forms through which accumulation proceeds when productive profitability is weak or when the state structures high-return rent opportunities. ↩