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Comrade Ammara

2. Method: dialectical and historical materialism

Marx’s starting point was not a general ethical denunciation of capitalism (capitalism is bad because it is unfair). He begins from the problem of how societies reproduce themselves over time. Capitalism is a “definite mode of production” with its own laws of motion.[5, 3]

2.1 Materialism

Materialism starts from a simple, stubborn fact: humans must labour on nature to survive—grow food, build shelter, fetch water, make tools, care for children and the sick, maintain bodies, repair machines. The way this labour is organised—who controls the means of production, who performs which tasks, who receives what share of the output—forms classes and produces class struggle.

The categories of Marxian political economy are therefore not timeless. They are historical forms of social relations. Wage-labour, profit, interest, rent, and the world market are specific to capitalism, just as tribute, serf obligations, and feudal dues were specific to other social formations.

2.2 Dialectics

Dialectics means thinking in terms of contradictions and totalities, not isolated variables.

  • A commodity is simultaneously useful (use-value) and an item for sale (exchange-value).

  • Labour is simultaneously concrete activity (teaching, sewing, coding) and socially commensurated abstract labour that takes the form of value.

  • Capitalist development raises productivity but also tends to reduce the share of living labour in production, undermining the very source of surplus value.

The dialectical move is to see how these opposites presuppose and transform each other, rather than choosing one side. For instance, capitalism cannot live without wage-labour; yet it constantly tries to replace workers with machines and algorithms. It cannot live without states and borders; yet it also needs global supply chains and mobile capital.

2.3 Historicity: categories as historical forms

Historical materialism insists that our categories are historically specific. The “laws” of capitalism emerge from the separation of producers from the means of production, the generalisation of commodity exchange, and the subordination of production to profit. The task is therefore to reconstruct how this mode of production works: from the commodity up to crises, imperialism, and the possibility of transition.[7, 36]

From the abstract to the concrete.

The ordering of this pamphlet follows a Marxist movement from the abstract to the concrete, and from the simplest form of appearance to the more complex totality it presupposes. We begin with the commodity and the value-form, because capitalism first confronts us as a world of commodities, prices, and exchange relations.[5] We then move to labour-power as a peculiar commodity, because only there do we find the hinge that makes profit compatible with apparently equal exchange. From that pivot we develop the production of surplus value (necessary and surplus labour time) and the rate of exploitation, before turning to how competition redistributes surplus value and, through the formation of prices of production, generates systematic divergences between values and market prices (see Section 7.2). On that basis we can treat credit and fictitious capital as claims on future surplus value that can expand well beyond the limits set by production and realisation, and therefore become a central transmission belt of crisis. We then extend the analysis to world-scale determinations—imperialism and unequal exchange—and to the reproduction of labour-power (social reproduction) as a part of the material conditions of accumulation, rather than a detached question of ethics and morality. Finally, we return to contemporary restructurings of the labour process and capitalist control (including platform power and AI): changes in technology and organisation that can transform how exploitation is administered and intensified, without abolishing the underlying relations that make value and accumulation possible.

2.4 Social labour, surplus, and the historical problem of control

A useful starting point is the concrete problem every human society must solve before anything called “the economy” can appear: how life is reproduced. People must eat, drink, rest, care for children and the sick, build shelter, store against bad seasons, learn skills, defend themselves, and coordinate work across time.

Humans have always done this through social labour. Individuals may forage, fish, or work alone, but durable survival under variable ecological conditions depends on coordination: shared knowledge, pooled risk, division of tasks, collective care, and forms of obligation and reciprocity.[18] The basic unit is a web of relations—kinship, households, camps, villages, pastoral networks, urban neighbourhoods, and work crews. Labour is social before it is “economic.”

Two clarifying definitions.

Surplus means output beyond what is immediately required to reproduce labour and social life at a given level (food beyond subsistence, stored grain, extra cloth, extra labour-time, etc.). Class begins where one group systematically controls the conditions of life for another—land, water, tools, storage, armed force, law—so that the producers must hand over surplus (in labour, produce, rent, tax, or money) to reproduce themselves.

For most of our history: foraging, sharing, and “primitive communism”

In Marxist writing, “primitive communism” is a shorthand for the fact that for much of human history, the means of life were not organised as alienable private property in land, tools, and people, but through customary access, collective obligations, and strong norms of sharing and reciprocity. That term should not be romanticised: foraging life could be harsh, vulnerable to illness and climate shocks, and marked by gendered divisions of labour that varied widely across regions. But it names a real historical point: long before markets became dominant, many societies reproduced themselves through collective control and social claims rather than through commodity exchange.[18, 19, 20]

Hunter-gatherer communities are also not a single type. Some were highly mobile; others were more sedentary. Some developed strong hierarchies under particular ecological conditions (for example, where storable, dense resources enabled durable inequality). The issue is historical specificity: the commodity-form is not the natural default of human life.

How much of the human timeline?

Anatomically modern Homo sapiens are at least on the order of \(\sim 315{,}000\) years old on current evidence.[15, 16] Agriculture and settled village life, by contrast, are extremely recent: they emerge unevenly in multiple regions during the Holocene climatic regime (the Holocene begins at \(11{,}700\) years b2k, i.e. roughly \(9700\) BCE).[17, 21, 22] Standard syntheses therefore stress that for the overwhelming majority of our species history, humans lived by hunting, fishing, and foraging.[18]

If we take \(\sim 315{,}000\) years as a conservative baseline for Homo sapiens and \(\sim 11{,}700\) years for the onset of the Holocene, then foraging-dominant reproduction represents roughly \(95\)–\(97\%\) of our species’ time. What people often remember as “\(\sim 10{,}000\) years ago” is usually the Neolithic transition: the uneven, regionally staggered onset of domestication, sedentism, and storage beginning around the terminal Pleistocene/early Holocene (on the order of 12–10k years ago in several regions). But state-based class society in the stricter sense—city–state complexes with taxation/tribute apparatuses, bureaucracy, durable institutionalised stratification, and (in some cases) written administration—becomes archaeologically legible later in some core regions, often in the fourth millennium BCE (hence a rough “\(\sim 5\)–\(6\)k years” anchor).[23]1

Marker (indicative horizon; not a single “stage”) Approx. years Share of sapiens time
Foraging-dominant reproduction (baseline \(\rightarrow\) Holocene climatic regime) \(\sim 303{,}000\) \(\sim 96\%\)
Neolithic transitions begin (cultivation/domestication, sedentism, storage in multiple regions) \(\sim 12{,}000\) \(\sim 3.8\%\)
Holocene begins (climatic context for many domestication trajectories) \(\sim 11{,}700\) \(\sim 3.7\%\)
State-based class societies (cities/states; tax/tribute; bureaucracy; durable stratification) \(\sim 5{,}500\) \(\sim 1\)–\(2\%\)
Capitalism (world-market formation; colonial expansion; generalised commodity dependence consolidates later) \(\sim 500\) \(\sim 0.1\)–\(0.2\%\)
Table 1. Compressed time-scales to keep “historicity” concrete. Percentages are shares of \(\sim 315{,}000\) years and are not additive: rows mark overlapping horizons rather than mutually exclusive periods.[15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 27]

The Neolithic transition: not one “revolution,” but many

What is often called the “Neolithic Revolution” is better treated as a long and uneven transition, across different ecologies, in which some communities intensified plant and animal management, experimented with cultivation, and in many regions gradually built more sedentary village life.[21, 22] Domestication was not a single invention in one place that then “diffused” to everyone else; multiple centres and pathways existed, and many people resisted, delayed, or partially adopted farming for good reasons.[23]

A minimal, non-teleological way to state the material stakes is this:

  • Storage and sedentism become more feasible as particular crops and animals are domesticated, climates stabilise (Holocene conditions), and infrastructures develop (fields, irrigation, granaries).

  • Population density can rise, and with it both collective capacities (large projects, craft specialisation) and new vulnerabilities (disease burdens, crop failure risks, dependence on staples).

  • Surplus becomes regular and legible in new ways—especially where staples can be measured, stored, and appropriated (grain is a classic case).[23]

This transition is also not “European.” South Asia, for example, contains some of the earliest village and farming evidence in the region at Mehrgarh (in today’s Balochistan), and later one of the world’s major early urban formations in the Indus/Harappan civilisation.[24, 25]

From surplus to class power: why control becomes a problem

Once a community can regularly produce and store a surplus, a political question becomes inescapable: who controls it? Who decides its use—for irrigation works, for feasts, for trade, for war-making, for temples, for reserves in famine years? And who enforces those decisions when conflict appears?

Surplus does not automatically produce domination. But it raises the stakes and tends to pull new institutions into being: storage and accounting; rules of access; specialists (scribes, priests, military organisers); and mechanisms of enforcement. The durable crystallisation of class domination is historically common where several dynamics converge:

  • Control of key means of life: land, pasture, water sources, forests, routes, ports, irrigation channels, granaries, seed, livestock.

  • Inheritable claims: rules that stabilise access across generations (inheritance, lineage property, caste endogamy, household patriarchy, legal title).

  • Coercive capacities: organised violence and law (armies, militias, courts, police, tribute collectors, debt enforcement).

  • Dependency through shortage: scarcity can be ecological (drought, flood, crop failure), but it can also be socially produced—through enclosure, exclusion, monopolies, debt, and forced taxation in money.[5]

  • Uneven social reproduction: control over women’s labour, sexuality, and reproduction often becomes a pillar of class rule, because reproducing labour (children, care, food preparation, household work) is itself a material process power seeks to regulate and discipline.[23]

There is no single ladder of “progress” from simplicity to complexity. Many communities have moved in and out of class relations; communal forms have persisted for centuries alongside empires; and conquest has forcibly combined different extraction logics in the same space. The materialist claim is narrower and stronger: class society is a historical answer to the problem of organising surplus and control—an answer built on durable asymmetry and coercion.

Varieties of class society (no single staircase)

Class domination has taken multiple forms, depending on ecology, technology, state formation, and conquest. A non-exhaustive map clarifies the range:

  • Slave societies and slave-based empires: where producers are owned as property and compelled directly by violence.

  • Serfdom and landlordism: where peasants are tied to land or landlords through customary obligation, rent, and extra-economic coercion.

  • Tributary formations: where states, temples, or ruling elites extract surplus through tax/tribute, corvée labour, and control of infrastructures (often including water and irrigation works).

  • Merchant and port-city dominance: where control of trade routes and credit shapes extraction, often layered on top of agrarian tribute or landlordism.

  • Casteed and racialised regimes of labour: where domination is stabilised through inherited hierarchy and enforced separation, articulating with tributary extraction, landlordism, or capitalism.

  • Colonial extraction: where conquest forcibly reorganises land, revenue, and labour, often creating new scarcities (cash taxes, enclosure, forced crop patterns) that push producers into dependency.[5]

These are not neat stages. They overlap. They combine. They are violently made and remade. But they share a family resemblance: a producing majority must transfer surplus to a ruling minority because the latter controls the means of life and the instruments of coercion.

Capitalism: when social coordination takes the commodity form

Capitalism cannot just be reduced to a growth in trade. Many societies traded; many had markets. The distinctiveness of capitalism is that commodity production becomes generalised and survival is systematically mediated by money. Production is organised for exchange; livelihoods depend on selling; and social coordination is imposed through the impersonal discipline of markets, prices, and competition.

Historically, capitalism develops through a specific combination of transformations:

  • Separation of producers from means of production (above all land): dispossession and enclosure create a class compelled to sell labour-power to live.[5, 33]

  • Consolidation of state power and law that stabilises property, contract, debt enforcement, and the political conditions for accumulation.[2]

  • Expansion of the world market through colonialism and slavery: conquest, forced labour, resource extraction, and the violent opening of markets are not “external” to capitalism but central to its world-scale formation.[5, 34]

  • Industrialisation and competitive accumulation: mechanisation raises productivity, concentrates workers, and produces a new kind of dependence: the wage, the factory, and the discipline of unemployment.[31, 32]

Capitalism is a historically specific form of social coordination. It organises society through private property and markets, reproducing a class structure in which capitalists own the means of production and workers must sell labour-power.

This is why the commodity carries a social relation. A commodity is a product (or service) produced for exchange in a system where producers must meet their needs through the market. When this becomes the dominant rule, even human capacities can be pulled into the commodity form. Labour-power becomes purchasable. And once labour-power is bought and set to work under capitalist control, exploitation becomes a normal, lawful feature of the system.

Contradiction and transition: when forms become fetters

Historical materialism does not say that society “naturally progresses” through fixed stages. It says something sharper: people make history under definite material conditions, and every mode of production develops contradictions that can make its own social relations into barriers to further development.

Marx’s classic formulation is that, at a certain point, the existing relations of production come into conflict with the development of productive forces; they become “fetters,” and an epoch of social revolution opens.[2] The specific contradictions differ:

  • Agrarian class societies often face contradictions between peasant reproduction and elite extraction (tax, rent, debt), producing chronic resistance, flight, and periodic collapse.[23]

  • Feudalism faced contradictions between seigneurial extraction and the expansion of commodity circuits, towns, and new productive capacities, helping to generate conflict over property, state power, and markets.[33]

  • Capitalism faces a contradiction between increasingly socialised production (collective labour, large-scale logistics, global coordination, automation) and private appropriation (profit, monopoly, rent). The same technologies that could reduce socially necessary labour and expand free time are used, under private property, to intensify work, discipline labour, and produce unemployment as leverage.[5]

From abundance to freedom: why a classless society is thinkable now

One reason capitalism can appear “natural” is that it presents itself as the only way to coordinate complex societies. But capitalism is a historically specific way of coordinating: through private property, profit, and enforced dependence on markets.

Today, the material basis for a different organisation of life is visible. Humanity can produce an enormous social surplus; the binding constraint for universal provision is less a lack of means than the social form that directs those means: profit first, property first, and the deliberate production of insecurity (unemployment, debt, eviction, austerity) as discipline.[5]

This is why the question of a classless society follows from the analysis itself. It names the contradiction between what we can collectively produce and the cramped, insecure way we are forced to live. To move beyond class society is to make social labour conscious: to treat the means of life—land, water, housing, energy, care, knowledge, infrastructure—as collectively governed, and to replace market compulsion with democratic planning and shared decision-making.

Why the working class is central.

Under capitalism, workers are not “outside” the system. They are the class that collectively runs production and circulation: factories, farms, hospitals, schools, software systems, ports, warehouses, municipal services. Capital depends on workers not as a charity recipient but as the living source of new value and the practical operator of the entire apparatus of social reproduction.[5, 1] That position gives the working class a strategic capacity no other exploited group possesses in the same way: the ability to halt production, disrupt circulation, and reorganise labour on a different basis. A socialist transition would mean more than just changing the personnel at the top. Workers and their allies would have to seize the means of production and reproduction and bring them under democratic control, so that automation and productivity become a common good rather than a weapon against labour.


  1. These are markers, not a single global clock. Farming spreads unevenly; some societies remain primarily foraging-based for millennia; and inequality can appear without full state formation. Commodity production and capitalism occupy only a thin slice of our species history; the dates are included to make that historical proportion visible. ↩